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Resum 
 
This project was developed for Indra Espacio in the context of a feasibility 
study about the future evolution of the European SBAS system EGNOS. 
 
The goal of the project is to add the Satellite Based Augmentation System 
(SBAS) capabilities on an existent GPS-differential solution developed by Sílvia 
Navarta as an end of studies project for Indra Espacio.  
 
With this previous work as a basis, this project reads the SBAS augmentation 
messages from a SBAS Rinex or EMS file, computes them and incorporates 
them (including fast, long term and ionospheric corrections) to the navigation 
solution. Then, it evaluates the performances of the system – in terms of 
accuracy, integrity and availability - to check whether it accomplishes the 
Required Navigation Performances (RNP) to be used for air navigation. 
 
The SBAS simulation was developed in Matlab© in post-processing mode, 
following the system requirements explained in the applicable standard for 
SBAS systems, the RTCA-DO-229D. The obtained results have been tested 
using an informatics program called Pegasus to ensure their complete validity 
and correctness. 
 
This project is divided in four big blocks. The first of them is an introduction on 
satellite positioning systems for air navigation, including the basic definitions on 
satellite positioning and air navigation. The second chapter is a detailed 
explanation about the SBAS system: it includes a brief explanation on its 
messages, and the SBAS positioning equations. Then, the third chapter 
explains the basic guidelines of the simulation code, including explanations on 
its functions and sub functions, and the fourth shows detailed result cases, 
compares them with Pegasus, and evaluates the use of the system for air 
navigation. 
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Overview 
 
Aquest projecte ha estat desenvolupat per a Indra Espacio en el marc d’un 
estudi de viabilitat sobre l’evolució futura del sistema d’augmentació per 
satèl·lit (SBAS) europeu EGNOS. 
 
L’objectiu d’aquest projecte va ser el d’afegir les correccions dels sistemes 
d’augmentació per satèl·lit (SBAS) a una solució GPS simple desenvolupada 
per Sílvia Navarta com a treball final de carrera per a Indra Espacio. 
 
Amb aquest treball anterior com a base, aquest projecte llegeix els missatges 
d’augmentació SBAS d’un fitxer RINEX SBAS o EMS, els computa (incloent 
les correccions ràpides, lentes i ionosfèriques), i les incorpora a la solució de 
navegació. Llavors avalua les actuacions del sistema – a nivell de precisió, 
integritat i disponibilitat – per tal de comprovar si el sistema compleix les 
prestacions requerides de navegació (RNP) per a ser utilitzats per a la 
navegació aèria. 
 
La simulació SBAS ha estat desenvolupada en matlab© en mode post-
processat, seguint els requeriments de sistema explicats a l’estàndard 
aplicable als sistemes SBAS, el RTCA-DO-229D. Els resultats obtinguts s’han 
comparat amb els d’un programa informàtic anomenat Pegasus per tal de 
garantir la seva completa correcció i validesa. 
 
Aquest projecte està dividit en quatre grans blocs. El primer d’ells és una 
introducció dels sistemes de posicionament per satèl·lit per a la navegació 
aèria, incloent les definicions bàsiques tant de sistemes de posicionament per 
satèl·lit com de navegació aèria. El segon capítol inclou una explicació 
detallada sobre els sistemes d’augmentació per satèl·lit (SBAS), així com les 
equacions de posicionament utilitzades per aquests sistemes. Després, el 
tercer capítol detalla les línies bàsiques del codi de la simulació, explicant les 
seves funcions i subfuncions, mentre que el quart mostra resultats concrets, 
els compara amb Pegasus, i avalua les prestacions del sistema per a ser 
utilitzat per a la navegació aèria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
While satellite positioning systems are being used for lots of civil purposes it 
was initially not possible to do so for civil aviation, as requirements are much 
stricter to guarantee a safe use of the air transport. Augmentation Systems 
(ABAS, GBAS and SBAS) were designed to fill this gap and allow satellite 
navigation to be compliant to the civil aviation requirements. 
 
The use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) gives lots of benefits to 
both users and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) because it is much 
easier and cheaper to use than traditional navigation aids (such as VORs, 
DMEs, ILSs, etc.), and it permits point-to-point navigation instead of aid-to-aid 
navigation, allowing a more flexible use of airspace, and reducing travel times 
and fuel costs. Furthermore, ground and space infrastructures are relatively 
limited and cheaper to install than traditional ones, and bandwidth is much more 
efficiently used. 
 
For all these reasons, there is a high institutional interest on SPS for air 
navigation, which opens the door to a progressive transition from ground-based 
infrastructures to satellite-based systems. This is clearly stated in the 
deliverable 3 of Eurocontrol’s Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) 
project, which establishes SPS as “primary means of air navigation”, leaving 
DME for backup means and decommissioning VORs and NDBs in the near 
future. 
 
The aim of this final project is to design a SBAS-enabled simulation in post-
processing mode capable of receiving both the GPS data and the SBAS 
augmentation data, and calculate with them the user’s position and its integrity 
parameters in order to evaluate whether the Satellite Based Augmentation 
Systems are safe enough to be used and certified for air navigation purposes. 
 
This simulation was programmed in Matlab© as a continuation of an existent 
GPS-alone simulation previously developed by Sílvia Navarta for Indra Espacio, 
which was capable of computing the user’s position by the classical GPS 
means. The current project aims to add the SBAS capabilities to the single GPS 
system to evaluate its improved performances for air navigation. 
 
The project is divided into four chapters: the first of them is a global introduction 
on satellite positioning systems and their use on air navigation, the second one 
explains the SBAS system and its properties, and the third one is a global view 
on the structure and functions of the developed simulation tool. Finally, the 
fourth chapter includes a summary of results and a global interpretation of them.  
 
The study is structured with a general to particular outline, in order to facilitate 
the global comprehension of the text, and make it easier to follow for non-expert 
readers. 
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1. CHAPTER 1. GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE 
SYSTEMS FOR AIR NAVIGATION 
 
1.1. Basic principles of satellite navigation 
 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are satellite-based global 
navigation systems designed to let its receivers determine its actual position 
within a few meters error by measuring time signals transmitted by radio from 
the satellites. 
 
The basic principles of the algorithm used to determine the receivers position 
need two basic pieces of information: the satellite position a known time, sent to 
the user in the navigation message, and the time it takes the signal to get to the 
user, which is measured. Once we get this information from four satellites at 
least, we can determine a 4-dimensional (x, y, z and time) approximated user 
position by trilateration. This is visually explained in Fig. 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 How GPS works [FAA] 
 
 
Nowadays, GPS is the only fully-deployed Global Navigation Satellite System, 
but other systems are in development: the Russian GLONASS, the European 
GALILEO and the Chinese COMPASS. 
 
1.2. The GPS System 
 
The Navstar GPS System was developed in the seventies by the Department of 
Defense of the United States. Although it was initially conceived as a military-
only positioning service, it was later opened to civilian use. 
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The GPS Space Segment consists of at least 24 satellites – nowadays 31 - 
orbiting at 26600 kilometers from the center of the Earth in an almost-circular 
orbit. The satellites are organized in six orbital planes, with a minimum of four 
satellites each; all inclined 55º from the Earth’s Equator. 
 
A network of Earth stations receive the satellite signals and compute the 
satellites position and their clock accuracy taking into account the deviations it 
may have from its ideal orbit. These data are processed by a central station 
which updates the navigation parameters in regularly-spaced intervals. 
   
 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 GPS Constellation 
 
 
1.3. Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems 
 
A Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) is a wide-area augmentation 
system whose function is to send additional information about the Satellite 
Positioning System to the users, such as clock drifts, ephemeris errors, 
ionosphere corrections, satellite health status, etc, using geostationary 
satellites. This information provides enhanced capabilities for error detection on 
the GPS solution and improves significantly the system’s integrity, availability 
and continuity, which are key factors for air navigation. 
 
SBAS systems use multiple Earth stations which measure GPS performances 
and estimate models of errors which are then broadcast to the users using the 
geostationary satellites. 
 
The US Wide Area Augmentation System (hereafter, WAAS) was the first SBAS 
system, together developed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with the aim to provide a radio navigation 
aid to allow Precision Approaches (PA) in airports with performances 
comparable to Category I Instrumental Landing System (ILS). 
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Later, other SBAS systems were ideated using the same principles as WAAS: 
MSAS (Japan), EGNOS (Europe) and GAGAN (India). Nowadays, the only 
commissioned systems are WAAS (since 2003) and MSAS (since 2007), while 
EGNOS available in open service and nowadays (2009) in the certification 
process. 
 
The following figure is an outline of the SBAS system. In it we can see the GPS 
satellites (in pink) that the user can see at a given moment, and the SBAS 
augmentation satellite (in orange), which provides to the user corrections and 
health parameters of the other satellites, improving the navigation solution and 
the integrity parameters. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Concept of SBAS [wikipedia] 
 
 
1.4. Use of Satellite Positioning Systems for air navigation 
 
The growth of air traffic experienced in the last years has revolutionized the way 
of conceiving the air transport. New and safer systems have been invented, and 
current systems have been improved. However, the basic ideas of the air 
navigation methods have not changed much in time – airplanes are still using 
Earth-based radio aids to position themselves, such as NDBs and VOR/DMEs, 
for the en-route and approach phases of flight. 
 
These ground-based radio aids were designed in the fifties and sixties, and may 
soon not be able to admit the traffic growths foreseen for the next years. 
Furthermore, the dependence on these Earth-based radio aids is so big that 
nowadays air navigation is done from radio aid to radio aid instead of following 
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the shorter way between the origin and the destination of the flight. This fact 
implies higher fuel consumptions and costs, as well as more contamination. But 
their inconveniences do not finish here: Earth-based radio aids are big and 
expensive to install and to maintain, and each one of them has a different 
frequency, occupying a big portion of the radio frequency spectrum. 
 
The Global Positioning Service (GPS) was seen as an alternative to earth-
based radio aids, as it is a global, free-of-charge service, with small and cheap 
receivers, working in CDMA (which allows to use only one frequency for all the 
users), and independent on earth stations, what would allow airplanes to follow 
user-preferred routes instead of aid-to-aid routes. But the GPS still had a big 
problem to solve: the guarantee and liability of the results. Currently, the 
standard GPS service permits the user to position itself, but provides neither 
guarantee nor responsibility on the correction of the results. In civil aviation, 
where the safety requirements are very strict, it is essential to have guarantees 
that the calculated data is correct and within the limits established to procure a 
safe flight. 
 
Parallel systems were designed to provide guarantee of the service, which gave 
the user mechanisms to check whether its calculated data were correct. These 
systems are called Augmentation Systems, and there are three kinds of them: 
the Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS), which use geostationary 
satellites to send the augmentation parameters, Ground Based Augmentation 
Systems (GBAS), which use ground stations to send the augmentation 
parameters, and Aircraft Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS), which use 
other sensors on board the aircraft to adjust the results obtained with the GPS 
receiver. 
 
Once the guarantee of service is provided and the civil aviation requirements 
are achieved, satellite navigation could become the primary means of air 
navigation. 
 
 
1.4.1. Introduction to navigation modes 
 
The Annex 10 (Aeronautical Communications) of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, published by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) [2], defines diverse navigation modes depending on the 
precision requirements for a particular phase of the flight. These navigation 
modes are, ordered from less to more restrictive: 
 
• En-route 
• En-route, terminal for en-route phases in Terminal Maneuvering Areas1 
(TMAs) 
                                            
1
 A Terminal Maneuvering Area is a controlled airspace in the vicinity of one or more major 
airports which needs a more careful control to protect traffic climbing in and out the airports. 
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• Non Precision Approaches/Initial Approach/Intermediate Approach 
(NPA) includes only lateral guidance and no vertical guidance is given. It is 
also known as LNAV (Lateral NAVigation) approach. 
• Precision Approaches (PA) includes lateral and vertical guidance. They 
were traditionally related to ILS systems, which subdivided the PAs in three 
categories: CAT-I, CAT-II and CAT-III, which at its time is subdivided in 
CAT-IIIa, CAT-IIIb and CAT-IIIc.  
 
SBAS systems were expected to provide performances equivalent to ILS CAT-I, 
but this objective was never achieved. For these reason a new Precision 
Approach sub mode was defined: the Approach oPerations with Vertical 
guidance (APV), an intermediate precision approach between NPA and CAT-I, 
which at its time was divided in APV-I and APV-II.  
 
The key differentiator between the different Approach navigation modes is the 
Decision Height (DH), which is the minimum altitude that the aircraft can reach 
during the approach without its equivalent Runway Visual Range (RVR). At this 
point the pilot must miss the approach if he doesn’t see the runway with the 
required RVR. The Decision Heights for each navigation mode are different on 
each airport depending on several factors (terrain, operational), but some 
typical DH values follow: 
 
 
Table 1.1 Decision Heights and RVRs for each navigation mode 
 
Mode Decision Height Runway Visual 
Range (RVR) 
Used Radio Aids 
NPA 350 ft  VOR, DME, NDB,  
GPS+RAIM2 
APV-I 350 ft  GPS+SBAS 
APV-II 250 ft  GBAS, ILS-CATI 
CAT-I > 200 ft > 550m GBAS, ILS-CATI 
CAT-II 100-200ft > 350m ILS-CATII 
CAT-IIIa < 100 ft > 200m ILS-CATIIIa 
CAT-IIIb < 50 ft 50-200m ILS-CATIIIb 
CAT-IIIc 0 ft 0 m ILS-CATIIIc 
 
 
GBAS systems are being developed to be able to achieve in the future 
performances equivalent to ILS CAT-II and ILS CAT-III. 
 
 
                                            
2
 RAIM: Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring. It is an Aircraft-Based Augmentation System 
(ABAS) designed to provide autonomous integrity monitoring for a GPS receiver. Its main idea 
is to compute the navigation solution for the different possible combinations in order to detect 
wrong results in determinate satellites (Fault Detection) and discard them if possible (Fault 
Detection and Exclusion) 
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1.4.2. Availability, continuity, integrity and accuracy of the systems 
 
The Annex 10 (Aeronautical Communications [2]), defines the minimum 
operational performances for the SPS based on four concepts, which are 
essential to understand the satellite-based systems performances: availability, 
continuity, integrity and accuracy: 
 
• Availability is the measure of the ability of the system to provide its required 
function and performance during its intended operation 
• Continuity is the measure of the ability of the total system to perform its 
function without interruption during its intended operation 
• Integrity is the measure of the probability of an undetected position failure 
• Accuracy is the measure of the total error that commits the system between 
the calculated position and the real position where the user stays 
 
The Annex 10 defines the maximum acceptable values for accuracy, integrity, 
time-to-alert, continuity and availability that the system must accomplish to be 
used in air navigation for each navigation mode as: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Maximum acceptable Accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability 
values3 [Annex 10, ICAO [2]] 
 
 
These factors are evaluated using the concepts of the Protection Levels, the 
Alarm Limits and the Navigation System Error: 
 
                                            
3
 Satellite-based systems, in particular GBAS systems, haven’t been able yet to achieve 
performances equivalent to ILS CAT-II and ILS CAT-III, so they are not included in the table, 
although they are expected to achieve similar performances in the future 
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• Protection Levels (HPL/VPL) are the measure of the maximum error that 
the system may have in local coordinates. They define a cylinder that is 
assured to contain the real position of the receiver. There are two Protection 
Levels: the Horizontal Protection level (HPL: the radius of the horizontal 
circle of the cylinder) and the Vertical Protection Level (VPL: the length of 
the cylinder segment in the vertical axis of the user). The user computes 
them as a function of the weighting matrix and the satellite geometries. 
• Alarm Limits (HAL/VAL) are the maximum error limits permitted with the 
required probability (its integrity value) for a particular navigation mode (en-
route, NPA, PA, CAT-I, etc.). Again, they are divided in the Horizontal Alarm 
Limit (HAL) and the Vertical Alarm Limit (VAL). ICAO’s annex 10 [2] defines 
these limits, which are shown in Fig. 1.5. 
• Navigation System Errors (HSE/VSE) are the difference between the 
calculated position and the real position of the user. They measure the 
accuracy of the system. They can’t be measured by airplanes, as they don’t 
know their exact position, but they can be analyzed using terrestrial station 
with already known positions supposing their performances are similar than 
those for airplanes. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.5 Alert Limits for each navigation mode [Annex 10, ICAO] 
 
 
The relationship between these three concepts can bring us to three different 
situations: normal operation, alarm operation and misleading information 
operation: 
 
• In normal operation, the protection limits are smaller than the alert limits 
and the system error is smaller than the protection limits. 
• An alarm operation or System Unavailable (SU) occurs when the 
protection limit is higher than the alert limit for that particular navigation 
mode. This advice tells the user that the system may have a positioning 
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error higher than the allowed error for that navigation mode, meaning that 
the user should rely on other positioning sources, as air navigation never 
relies on only one navigation system. Alarm operations are availability errors 
but not integrity errors, as the user knows that there could be a mistake in 
the positioning system. 
• A Misleading Information (MI) occurs when the system error is higher than 
the protection limit. This means that there is a mistake that has been 
undetected by the system (no alarm is raised) and the system believes its 
positioning calculation is working properly when it isn’t. MIs are difficult to 
detect and are considered integrity failures. 
 
Other subtypes can be considered if we mix the original concepts: a Hazardous 
Misleading Information (when the System Error is higher than both the 
Protection Level and Alert Limit), or a combination of both an alarm operation 
and a MI at the same time (when the System Error is higher than both the 
Protection Level and Alert Limit, and the Protection Level is higher than the 
Alert Limit). 
 
The Fig. 1.6 clarifies these concepts by printing in the same graph the Alert 
Limits, the Protection Levels and the System Error: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6 Relationship between VAL, VPL and NSE [The EGNOS book [3]] 
 
 
Another good approach to the understanding of the Integrity Concept is the 
Stanford diagram, developed by the WAAS division of the Californian 
University of Stanford. Its basic idea is to plot in the same graph the protection 
levels versus the navigation system error for fix terrestrial stations with known 
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positions. This allows the user to see in a glance the amount of alarms (those 
points over the Alarm Limits) and MIs (those points in the right of the diagonal of 
the diagram) that the system has committed in a period of time, and evaluate 
whether the system performances are adequate for its design or not, or for 
which navigation modes they work. It is done separately in the horizontal and 
the vertical dimensions, and uses different colors depending on the point 
density of the results in the graph. Examples of the Stanford Diagram are 
shown in Fig. 1.8 and Fig. 1.7. 
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Fig. 1.7 Stanford Vertical Integrity Diagram for BELF0340.09 with SBAS PRN 
120 
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Fig. 1.8 Stanford Horizontal Integrity Diagram for BELF0340.09 with SBAS PRN 
120 
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The European Space Agency (ESA) introduced a modification on the Stanford 
diagram to focus the diagram on integrity. Its main idea is to include all the 
visible combinations of satellites that the user can use to compute a navigation 
solution instead of just using the all-in view approach (compute the solution with 
all the visible satellites at the moment), to evaluate all the solution possibilities 
instead of just the ideal one. This diagram is known as the All-Stanford-ESA 
Diagram, and some examples of it follow: 
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Fig. 1.9 Stanford Vertical Integrity Diagram for BELF0340.09 with SBAS PRN 
120 
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Fig. 1.10 Stanford Vertical Integrity Diagram for BELF0340.09 with SBAS PRN 
120 
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2. CHAPTER 2. THE SBAS SYSTEM IN DETAIL 
 
 
The use of SBAS systems provide users with: 
 
• Differential corrections to be added on the pseudorange4 measurements. 
• Corrections variance parameters to establish a weighting matrix which 
allows the users to prioritize those satellites with better performances at the 
time or with better geometries than others 
 
The application of these parameters improves significantly the navigation 
solution and the system integrity parameters. 
 
The latest SBAS MOPS (Minimum Operational Performance Standards) are 
defined in the RTCA-DO229D document with the WAAS system architecture 
[1], which was later used for the other SBAS systems and approved by the 
ICAO in the Annex 10 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation [2]. 
 
 
2.1. The SBAS Messages 
 
The MOPS, in its Appendix A “Space-Based Augmentation System Signal 
Specification”, divides the information send by the geostationary satellite to the 
users in 20 different types of messages of 250 bits length in 1 second time 
each. These messages provide three types of corrections: 
 
• Fast corrections correct fast-changing parameters such as clock errors. 
They include pseudorange corrections and UDRE (User Differential Range 
Error) values for the weighting matrix 
• Long term corrections are corrections on the satellite position and time 
offset sent in the navigation message of the GPS signal that change slowly 
in time 
• Ionospheric corrections send an ionospheric model which estimates the 
delay that the range suffers when it crosses the ionosphere 
 
The messages are structured in a fix block data format explained in Fig. 2.1. 
 
 
                                            
4
 The pseudorange is the equivalent in distance to the measured time difference between the 
GPS satellite and the user, which is calculated in real time by the suer through the received 
signal correlation with a local replica. 
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Fig. 2.1 Structure of the SBAS Messages [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
The first 8 bits are the preamble of the message, which are alternatively 83, 154 
or 198. The following 6 bits are the message type identifier, which is then 
followed by the 212 useful bits, or body, of the message. The last 24 bits of the 
message are a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) that allows the user to detect 
wrong message input data due to noise or receiving interferences. 
 
The most important messages sent by the SBAS systems are explained next. 
 
 
2.1.1. MT0. Do not use for safety applications 
 
In normal operation, the SBAS Message Type 0 (hereafter, MT) indicates that 
the data that the GEO satellite sends is not safe and shouldn’t be used in the 
position calculation for at least one minute. In that case, the user should select 
another GEO satellite if available, or rely on other sources for its positioning. 
 
While testing (as is EGNOS doing at the date), the fast correction data of the 
MT2 (see section 2.1.3) will be send in the MT0 to advice users not to rely its 
safety applications on this data. 
 
 
2.1.2. MT1. PRN Mask Assignments 
 
The MT1 defines the satellites that the system is broadcasting by its Pseudo 
Random Noise5 (hereafter, PRN) code, independently of whether they are 
monitored6 or not. It only changes when new satellites are launched or 
integrated in the system. 
 
The broadcasted satellites are ordered by its PRN, as follows: 
 
 
                                            
5
 The satellite PRN is a number that identifies each satellite, so we have satellite PRN1, satellite 
PRN2, etc. 
6
 A satellite is unmonitored when it is not seen by any of the SBAS ground stations because it is 
located somewhere else on the earth. The SBAS system broadcasts unmonitored values for all 
the correspondent data to unmonitored satellites, even though it won’t be used. 
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Fig. 2.2 Satellite PRN Distribution [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
Its 210 useful bits of the message are marked with a “1” if the satellite is 
broadcast or a “0 if it isn’t, to a maximum of 51 selected satellites. This allows a 
better bandwidth efficiency for the rest of messages, as from here on they will 
refer to “satellite no. 3 in the PRN Mask” instead of “Satellite PRN 3”. This 
would allow the receiver to retrieve data from satellite no 37, for instance, 
without having to know data from the inexistent satellite 36, if the case. 
 
 
2.1.3. MT2-5. Fast Corrections 
 
The fast corrections message includes: 
 
• Pseudo Range Corrections (PRC) to be added on the pseudorange of 
each satellite 
• User Differential Range Correction Indicators (UDREI) are satellite health 
parameters which take values between 1 (very healthy) and 15 (do not use). 
Each value is equivalent to a certain weight to be applied on the weighting 
matrix (explained in detail in section 2.3. The SBAS Basic Positioning 
Equation). If it is equal to 14 it means that the satellite is not monitored and if 
it is equal to 15 it means that the satellite may be experiencing technical 
problems and its ranging data must not be used. 
 
As the Fast Corrections are sent for each satellite separately, the MT2 refers to 
satellites 1 to 13 in the PRN Mask (MT1), the MT3 to 14-26, etc. The format of 
the data sent is explained in Fig. 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Fast Corrections Messages 2-5 [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
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The fast corrections values are broadcast continuously and have very little 
applicability times. Approximately the 75% of the data that sends the GEO 
contains only Fast Corrections data. 
 
 
2.1.4. MT6. Integrity Information Message 
 
If there may be an integrity problem with the data broadcast in the fast 
corrections, and UDREI values need a fast actualization, a MT6 is sent. It 
includes the UDREI values for the 51 satellites selected in the PRN Mask. Its 
structure is defined in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 Integrity Information Message 6 [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
2.1.5. MT25. Long Term Corrections (LTC) 
 
Long Term Corrections send corrections to the users on the satellite position 
sent in the GPS Navigation Message in ECEF coordinates X, Y, Z and time. 
 
The data in MT25 is divided in 2 equal parts of 106-bits each. In each one of 
them the first bit is the “velocity code”, a key factor to understand the LTCs. If 
the velocity code is set to 0, the following correction includes only increments of 
the 4-dimensional satellite position (∆x, ∆y, ∆z and ∆t), while if it is set to 1, it 
includes the 4-D position increments and the 4-D velocity increments (∆x, ∆y, 
∆z, ∆t, ∆ x& , ∆ y& , ∆ z&  and ∆ t&), always respect to the GPS navigation message 
ephemerides. 
 
As velocity code 0 sends less data (only 4 values) than velocity code 1 (8 
values) for each satellite, each half of the message for velocity code 0 is able to 
broadcast data for 2 satellites, while for velocity code 1 it can broadcast data for 
only 1 satellite. Then, each MT25 can broadcast data for 2 satellites (if both 
velocity codes are set to 1), 4 satellites (if both velocity codes are set to 0), or 
for 3 satellites (if one of them is set to 0 and the other one is set to 1). 
 
The bits distribution of both cases can be seen in Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6. 
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Fig. 2.5 Long Term Corrections Message 25 with velocity code 0 [RTCA-Do-
229D [1]] 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.6 Long Term Corrections Message 25 with velocity code 1 [RTCA-Do-
229D [1]] 
 
 
2.1.6. MT24. Mixed Fast and Long Term Corrections 
 
The MT24 is divided in two parts: in one of them the system broadcasts Fast 
Corrections (PRCs and UDREIS) for 6 satellites and in the other it broadcasts 
Long Term Corrections with the same format as each half of the MT25. 
 
This is especially useful when, for instance, the PRN Mask includes 32 
satellites. If we think about how to send the fast corrections data for 32 satellites 
in the different messages, we’ll use MT2 for satellites 1 to 13, MT3 for satellites 
14 to 26, and it doesn’t worth sending a whole Message Type 4 with blanks for 
13 satellites when we are only going to use 6 (32-26). Sending a MT24 instead 
permits us to make use of the other half to fit a LTC message in it. 
 
 
 
 
18                   Development of a SBAS-enabled software for integrity evaluation 
 
Fig. 2.7 Example of MT 24 [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
2.1.7. MT18. Ionospheric Grid Point Masks 
 
This message does the same function as the PRN Mask for the Ionospheric 
Corrections. To understand how it works are basic two concepts: 
 
• The Ionospheric Pierce Point (IPP) for a determinate satellite is the point 
where the satellite signal crosses the ionosphere. We consider it does so at 
around 350 km height from the earth surface 
 
• The Ionospheric Grid Points (IGPs) are fixed points in the sky with 
determinate latitudes and longitudes to which the SBAS system estimates 
the ionospheric delay. Knowing the delay of the IGPs that surround the user, 
we can extrapolate the IGPs to each satellite’s Ionospheric Pierce Point and 
get the ionospheric delay for each one of the satellites in sight 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.8 Example of 4-point IPP interpolation [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
The Sky is divided in almost 2200 IGPs subdivided in 11 bands (200 bits/1 
message each). The MT18 marks as “1” each bit of the IGP Mask if the system 
is broadcasting data for its equivalent IGP (even if it is unmonitored or no data 
is measured for it) and as “0” if it isn’t. Later, the MT26 will broadcast the values 
for each one of the monitored points referred just to, for instance, “the 4th IGP in 
the IGP mask for band 4”. The format of the MT18 is as follows: 
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Fig. 2.9 IGP mask MT 18 [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
2.1.8. MT26. Ionospheric Delay Corrections 
 
Each MT26 sends a 15-IGP block for a determinate IGP band which includes, 
for each IGP: 
 
• The ionospheric correction that, once interpolated to the user’s IPP, will 
be added on the pseudorange measurement. It is equivalent to the fast 
corrections PRC value 
• Its GIVEI (Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error Indicator) value, which indicates 
the “health” of the IGPs. Each GIVEI is equivalent to a certain variance 
(σ2GIVE) value, which interpolated to the user’s IPP gives the receiver the 
variance of the ionospheric correction that will be used to compute the 
weighting matrix (explained in detail in section 2.3. The SBAS Basic 
Positioning Equation). It is equivalent to the UDREI value for the fast 
corrections, and it includes, too, “not monitored” and “do not use” IGPs 
 
If an IGP is not monitored or cannot be used, a three-point interpolation can be 
done with the other three IGPs if the IPP is inside the triangle they form. If it is 
not inside, or more than one IGP is not monitored, bigger IGPs squares, 
triangles or rectangles should be used instead of the nearest IGPs to the user. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.10 IGP delay corrections MT 26 [RTCA-Do-229D [1]] 
 
 
2.1.9. MT7 and MT10. Degradation Factors Messages 
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The Degradation Factors Messages send to the user factors which define the 
current situation of the system and that are used in many equations to compute 
the variances σ2 that are later used to create the weighting matrix. 
 
The MT7 sends the Degradation Factors for the Fast Corrections only, and the 
MT10 sends the Degradation Factors for the rest of corrections. 
 
 
2.2. The SBAS preprocessing file exchange formats 
 
There are multiple ways of writing in a file the SBAS broadcast data for a 
determinate period of time. Here two of them will be seen: the RINEX-type 
Exchange File for GEO SBAS Broadcast, and the EGNOS Message Server 
(EMS) format, developed by the European Space Agency. 
 
The basic idea of them is to write in a file the SBAS bit chains sent by the 
geostationary satellites during a certain period of time. As writing 250-bit chains 
would be too uncomfortable to visualize and to be contained in a single row of 
an archive, both systems convert the 250-bits into 64 hexadecimal characters 
that can be displayed in a row altogether. 
 
2.2.1. The RINEX-type SBAS format 
 
This format was developed by the French Centre National d'Études Spatiales 
(CNES) together with the US UNAVCO consortium. Its main idea was to 
develop a file exchange format similar to the widely-used RINEX format for 
exchange of GPS data. The file naming convention, then, would be the same as 
for GPS RINEX files (4-char station code, 3-char day of the year, hour of the 
day, point, 2-char year, and the b letter to define the SBAS data). 
 
It can include the SBAS data for one single satellite or for several of them. The 
first rows of the file for the EGNOS satellite PRN 120 from the 2nd of January of 
2009 follow, as an example: 
 
 
2.10            B                                 RINEX VERSION / TYPE 
ConsolideSBAS CNES            09/01/09 02:40       PGM / RUN BY / DATE 
SBAS consolidation file for PRN 120             COMMENT 
                                                         END OF HEADER 
120 09 01 02 00 00 00.1  L1    32     0   SBA 
 27    53 6C 00 40 F4 6E C0 A0 A2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 25 3D C8 40 
120 09 01 02 00 00 01.1  L1    32     0   SBA 
  3    9A 0E 00 08 00 3F F0 01 BF F4 00 3F D8 00 00 00 01 00 
       00 03 00 31 7B 9A 79 BB 9B 99 54 E5 98 00 
120 09 01 02 00 00 02.1  L1    32     0   SBA 
  0    C6 01 00 03 FE C0 00 00 00 00 00 3F C7 FC C0 08 00 00 
       00 00 00 03 BB BB 95 55 7B BB 8D 2D FE 80 
120 09 01 02 00 00 03.1  L1    32     0   SBA 
 24    53 63 FF C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 BB BB B8 90 0C 67 F0 
       FF FA FF B5 D2 3E BF 5F C8 1C 21 C7 6A 00 
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Fig. 2.11 Example of SBAS RINEX-type format 
 
 
As seen before, for each second the file includes: the satellite PRN number (in 
this case 120), the date and time of the observation (in the first case, for 
instance, year: 09, month: 01, day: 00, hour: 00, minute: 00, second: 00.1), the 
band used to send the data (currently L1 only), the length of the message in 
bytes (32) a file index (0) and the letters SBA to identify it transmits SBAS data. 
In the next line, the file includes the message type identifier (in the first case, 
27), and the 32-bytes of the data divided in groups of two hexadecimal digits. 
The 6 extra bits included in the file (32-bytes are equivalent to 256 bits) must be 
discarded by the user. 
 
Diary broadcast SBAS files for EGNOS satellite numbers 120, 124 and 126, 
and for WAAS satellites 135 and 138 are available for free on the internet using 
the CNES Serenad Data Server. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Egnos Message Server Format (EMS) 
 
The EMS format was developed by the European Space Agency in order to 
provide a format with which the consortium would exchange the SBAS message 
files send by EGNOS using an FTP (File Transfer Protocol). 
 
Its format is quite similar to the previous one, but here the hexadecimal chains 
of numbers do not include gaps every two digits as the SBAS RINEX format did. 
This allows each second broadcast data to be written in a single line. 
 
In this case, the broadcast data includes: the satellite number, year, month, day, 
hour, minute, second, message type, and the hexadecimal chain of bytes. 
 
An example of an EMS file containing the data sent by the SBAS PRN120 the 
14th of January of the year 2009 follows: 
 
 
120 09 01 14 00 00 00 9 C627A6A2FEF3715D9EF24696C01AF64FF9FF2DB000DC29FB8FF1FFC01B964800 
120 09 01 14 00 00 01 0 5300000000000000000000002FFCBFD4000024000003BBBBB955BBBB92453040 
120 09 01 14 00 00 02 3 9A0E3FE0003FFC00BFEC000000008003FD8003FE8009795579BB97957C4725C0 
120 09 01 14 00 00 03 24 C663FEC0000000000000017BBBB89034B20EF7837F46DBFEFED110280C51EA40 
120 09 01 14 00 00 04 7 531CC3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC00000000000000000019B80780 
 
Fig. 2.12 Example of an EMS SBAS file 
 
 
2.3. The SBAS Basic Positioning Equation 
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The SBAS positioning equation is the GPS-alone equation with the extra 
parameters sent by the GEO satellite. A brief explanation of these equations 
follows: 
 
 
1. Prefit calculation for each visible satellite 
 
The prefit is the difference between the measured range and the calculated 
range, including all the estimated corrections: 
 
 
 (2.1) 
 
 
Where: 
 
• PR is the measured pseudorange, obtained from the RINEX observation 
file 
• geo is the calculated distance between the user and the satellite 
(including the satellite long term corrections) 
 
 
 (2.2) 
 
 
The user position is the position calculated in the previous observation, 
as the current position has not been obtained yet. 
 
• dtSat is the satellite’s clock drift 
• tLTC is the time long term correction 
• rela is the relativity correction 
• TGD is the Total Group Delay 
• FC are the fast corrections 
• Iono is the ionospheric correction 
• Tropo is the tropospheric correction 
 
With the prefits from all the visible satellites we compute the P vector: 
 
 
                                                (2.3) 
 
 
2. Total variance computation for each satellite 
 
The total variance for each satellite is computed as: 
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                 (2.4) 
 
 
Where: 
 
•  is the fast and long term corrections variance 
•  is the ionospheric variance 
•  is the variance due to the noise 
•  is the tropospheric variance 
•  is the multipath variance 
 
 
3. W matrix calculation  
 
Once having discarded all satellites without fast corrections, ionospheric 
corrections or long term corrections, as well as those with bad geometries and 
low elevations, for the n seen satellites we compute the W matrix as: 
 
 
                             (2.5) 
 
 
4. G matrix calculation  
 
The G matrix can be computed in ECEF or in ENU coordinates for the n 
satellites, as: 
 
 
                 (2.6) 
 
 
   (2.7) 
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5. Position estimation 
 
The position increment is computed as 
 
 
                     (2.8) 
 
 
This position increment is added on the previous calculated position to get the 
actual calculated position. So, as it is seen, this system needs a previous 
position to compute its current position, and it needs a first position, which is 
calculated using the Bancroft’s method7. 
 
 
6. Protection Levels computation 
 
The Horizontal and Vertical Protection Levels are calculated as follows: 
 
 
                    (2.9) 
 
 
                 (2.10) 
 
 
                                      (2.11) 
 
 
                                         (2.12) 
 
Where k is a fix constant: 
• K = 5.33 for the VPL 
• K = 6.18 for the HPL if the navigation mode is a Non Precision Approach 
• K = 6 for the HPL if the navigation mode is a Precision Approach 
                                            
7
 The Bancroft’s method calculates a first approximate position of the user taking only into 
account the satellite geometries. It is used for initialization of the GPS calculation, for those 
cases when no previous position is known 
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3. CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 
This chapter includes an outline of the code (section 3.1) and explains the 
result’s validation methods used (section 3.2). 
 
3.1. Outline of the simulation code 
 
The SBAS-enabled receiver simulation was made as a continuation of a 
previous differential-GPS simulation developed by Sílvia Navarta as a final 
project for Indra Espacio.  
 
As the goal of this project is to add the SBAS corrections to the previous GPS-
alone solution, the essential structure of both systems is the same but the 
added SBAS functions. Consequently, some of the functions used in the code 
were developed by other Indra Espacio engineers. 
 
The basic inputs and outputs of the program are shown next: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Summary of the main function 
 
 
The application is divided in three big blocks: 
 
1. Load_inputs reads the input navigation and observation files, as well as the 
SBAS-augmentation files. 
 
2. Navigation_solution computes the navigation solution and the integrity 
parameters. 
 
3. Results_evaluation evaluates the results and their performances, and then 
plots the navigation system error graph, the integrity values evolution, the 
Stanford diagrams, and computes all the combinations solution to plot the 
all-Stanford-ESA integrity diagram. 
 
A more detailed explanation of the three blocks follows. 
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Fig. 3.2 Global Outline of the simulation code 
 
 
3.1.1. Load_inputs.m 
 
The first block of the simulation reads the input files and stores its data in 
matrixes. An outline of its structure is presented in Fig. 3.3. 
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Fig. 3.3 Summary of the load_inputs function 
 
 
3.1.1.1. Get_sbas_data.m  
 
This function reads the SBAS augmentation data. It includes two big functions, 
which are: 
 
• Get_sbas_obs.m opens the file and reads its content. For each epoch gets 
the SBAS data matrixes: its applicability time (sbasEpochs), its message 
type (messageType), and its 250-bit binary data (binDataMatrix). 
• Read_messages.m reads the previous matrixes, and classifies its data for 
their different message types. Then, for each message, reads its contents, 
computes its values, and puts them in more specific matrixes with the SBAS 
augmentation data (such as prnMask, prc, udrei, longTermCor, igpMask, 
igpData, ai, degFact, serviceMsg and covMsg). 
 
 
3.1.1.2. Get_eph.m  
 
This function reads the navigation RINEX file and gets all the ephemeris data 
(in eph) and the Klobuchar ionosphere parameters (iono_coef), used only 
when no SBAS ionosphere data is provided or during initialization. 
 
3.1.1.3. Get_obs.m8  
 
This function opens the observation RINEX file and gets from it the 
pseudorange measurements (C1), the phase measurements (L1), the interval 
between observations (normally 1 or 30 seconds), the epoch of each 
measurement and the receiver position (Rx_position). 
 
 
3.1.2. Navigation_solution.m 
 
This function is the central function of the code. Its goal is to identify the 
applicable ephemeredes, pseudorange and corrections for each epoch and 
compute the navigation solution and the integrity parameters with them. It is 
divided in four blocks: smooth-pseudorange, estimated receiver, load satellites 
and compute_solution, as explained next: 
 
 
                                            
8
 . This function was developed by Joan Erencia and Sílvia Navarta 
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Fig. 3.4 Summary of navigation_solution function 
 
 
3.1.2.1. Smooth_Pseudorange.m 
 
Identifies the Cycle Slips when they are higher than a determinate threshold 
(usually 3) and reinitializes the filter when this happens. 
 
 
Smooth_pseudorange.m
C1
L1
epochFlag
interval
LLI
trx
Cycle_slip.m
Get_smoothed.m
cycleSlips
pseudoRange
 
 
Fig. 3.5  Summary of smooth_pseudorange function 
 
 
3.1.2.2. Estimated_receiver.m 
 
Estimated Receiver is a function that applies the Bancroft method to initialize 
the user receiver’s position taking only the satellites into account. This function 
is only useful for initialization of the receiver position when no previous position 
is known by the user, as it produces big mistakes. It is only applied in the first 
observation. 
 
 
3.1.2.3. Load_satellites.m 
 
Load Satellites is a very big function that is called at each observation. Its main 
idea is to load the applicable satellite data from the observations, the 
ephemeredes and the SBAS inputs, and identify the applicable corrections for 
each epoch and satellite. 
 
It is, at the time, subdivided in different functions: 
 
1. Count_visible_satellites returns a vector with the number of visible 
satellites and their PRN numbers. 
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2. Compute_satellite_position computes the satellite position of each 
satellite including the Long Term Corrections, the Earth Rotation 
Corrections and the relativity corrections. 
 
 
Compute_satellite_position.m
longTermCor appLtclong_term_corrections.m
ephemerides
trx
Get_time_emission.m relativity
ephSat
Satellite_position.m
Earth_rotation.m
satPos
satPospreviousPos
dtSat
timeSat
pseudoRange
 
 
Fig. 3.6 Summary of comptue_satellite_position function 
 
 
3. Compute_fast_corrections computes the applicable fast corrections 
and the fast corrections variance ( ) using as inputs the PRC data, 
the UDREI data, and the δUDRE data. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.7 Summary of the Fast Corrections function 
 
 
4. Compute_ionospheric_corrections estimates the ionospheric 
corrections by SBAS means if they are provided. If they aren’t, then 
applies the Klobuchar parameters to estimate them. By the SBAS 
means, the method of calculation follows: 
 
• det_ipp_location determines the satellite’s IPP 
• det_surrounding_igps determines the possible IGPs that the 
user may have around 
• get_igp_no checks if the previous IGPs exist in the IGP table 
• get_igpmask_no checks if the IGPs exist in the IGP Mask 
• get_igp_data loads the data for the selected IGPs, and checks if 
they are monitored. If three of them are monitored, checks 
whether the IPP is inside the triangle they form. 
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If in any of the previous checks is not found, the system comes back to 
det_surrounding_igps to look for new applicable IGPs to the user. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.8 Summary of the Ionospheric Corrections function 
 
 
5. Compute_tropospheric_corrections estimates the tropospheric delays 
that the signal may suffer between the satellites and the user, and the 
variance of these values ( ). This is done following the MOPS 
model, which estimates the tropospheric delay knowing the satellite and 
the user’s position and the day of the year. This calculation is done 
independently of the SBAS messages, as SBAS systems don’t provide 
tropospheric SBAS corrections. 
 
6. Get_geometric_distance computes the geometric distance between the 
satellite’s position and the user’s previous position. 
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Fig. 3.9 Summary of the Load Satellites function 
 
 
3.1.2.4. Compute_solution.m 
 
With the prefits, variances and the satellites position this function computes the 
navigation solution and the protection levels for the current observation as 
explained in section 2.3, The SBAS Basic Positioning Equation. With the real 
position of the station, if provided, the function computes the Navigation System 
Error. The calculated user position will be kept for the next observation 
calculations, becoming the previous position variable in the next loop. 
 
This function will be again called later in the third block if the user wants to 
compute the All Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagram to compute the all case data. 
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Fig. 3.10 Summary of the Compute Solution function 
 
 
3.1.3. Results_evaluation.m 
 
This function reads the results and evaluates their performances for air 
navigation. Then, it computes the various integrity plots: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.11 Summary of the Results evaluation function 
 
3.1.3.1. Check_results.m 
 
Classifies the obtained solutions and determines whether they are certifiable or 
not for the selected navigation mode. Then it writes on a text file the availability, 
integrity and accuracy results and whether they accomplish or not the limits for 
the current navigation mode. An example of the text file follows: 
 
 
SBAS Simulation 
Copyright (C) 2009, INDRA ESPACIO S.A 
Developed by Pol Sala (psala@eservicios.indra.es) 
Files selected: "PLAN001A09" with SBAS PRN120 
 
Process Started at 13-Mar-2009 13:38:56 
Smooth Activated 
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- Load Files: 
·SBAS Data read 
·GPS Navigation Rinex Read 
·GPS Observation Rinex Read 
·SBAS messages computed 
Elapsed time: 555.5331 seconds 
 
- Navigation Solution 
0h0m0s, iObs=1. Not enough satellites for calculation 
0h0m30s, iObs=2. Mode Switched to Smoothed GPS Stand-Alone 
0h2m30s, iObs=6. Mode Switched to Smoothed SBAS 
0h28m0s-0h30m0s. Missing Observation inputs 
0h30m0s, iObs=58. Mode Switched to Unsmoothed SBAS 
0h30m30s, iObs=59. Mode Switched to Smoothed SBAS 
Missing "3" observation input epochs 
 
- Analysis of results 
All data computed for "PLAN001A09" using SBAS PRN120 for APV-I with 
"0" MIs, "0" alarms, and "3" epochs without solution 
* Availability analysis: 
·97.1963percent 
·Minimum value: 99percent... Not achieved 
* Integrity analysis: 
·100percent 
·Minimum value: 100percent... Achieved 
* Accuracy analysis: 
·Horizontal Accuracy (95percent):0.90555m 
·Maximum value: 40m... Achieved 
·Vertical Accuracy (95percent):0.8032m 
·Maximum value: 50m... Achieved 
 
Process Terminated at 13-Mar-2009 13:48:21 
Elapsed time: 564.9557 seconds 
 
Fig. 3.12 Solution text file example 
 
 
3.1.3.2. Plot_navigation_error.m9 
 
Plots the horizontal and vertical errors in a graph: 
 
 
                                            
9
 This function was developed by David Luengo Artero. 
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Fig. 3.13 Navigation Error Plot for EBRE350EH using SBAS PRN 120 
 
 
3.1.3.3.  Plot_integrity_evolution.m  
 
This function plots the evolution of the Protection Levels and Navigation System 
Error to visualize MIs and alarms, or accumulative errors if existent.  The HALs 
and VALs are also plotted. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.14 Navigation Error Plot for EBRE350EH using SBAS PRN 120 
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3.1.3.4. Plot_stanford_diagrams.m  
 
Plots the classic Stanford diagrams: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.15 Stanford Vertical Integrity Diagram for EBRE350EH using SBAS PRN 
120 
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Fig. 3.16 Stanford Horizontal Integrity Diagram for EBRE350EH using SBAS 
PRN 120 
 
 
3.1.3.5. Compute_allcase_data.m 
 
This function computes the navigation solution (using function 
compute_solution.m, explained in section 3.1.2.4) for all the possible 
combinations of the seen satellites. The function first calculates the number of 
possible combinations using the binomial coefficient, and then computes the 
navigation solution for each one of them. These data are required to plot the All 
Stanford ESA Integrity Diagram, and to have a more complete analysis of the 
whole (and most restrictive) performances of the system. It is needed to say 
that this function will take large amounts of time to compute the results. 
 
 
3.1.3.6. Plot_all_stanford_esa_diagrams.m  
 
It is essentially the same function as plot_stanford_diagrams.m but plots the all 
case data instead of the complete vision combination. It is much more restrictive 
than the classical plot. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.17 All Stanford-ESA Horizontal Integrity Diagram for EBRE350EH using 
SBAS PRN 120 
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Fig. 3.18 All Stanford-ESA Vertical Integrity Diagram for EBRE350EH using 
SBAS PRN 120 
 
 
3.2. Validation of the results 
 
The validation of the results was made using a tool developed by Eurocontrol 
called PEGASUS (Prototype Egnos and GBAS Analysis System Using 
Sapphire), which aims to become a standard processing and analyzing tool to 
be used for SBAS and GBAS operational validation. Pegasus gives the 
navigation results for the input files, as well as various parameters used for the 
computation, such as the range corrections and weights for each correction 
(fast, long term, ionospheric, tropospheric, etc.) and each satellite. 
 
It is assumed that the best achievable performances of the system are those 
provided by Pegasus and thus the differences between both results are shown 
next. These differences can be considered as code errors, if we presuppose 
that the Pegasus results are optimal, or as simple disconformities between two 
different interpretations of the SBAS standards. 
 
In many cases there are little mistakes or disconformities with Pegasus, which 
are always smaller than 4mm and thus are considered not to be significant in 
the results. Most of the following errors are caused by the different rounding 
methods10 used by both systems, and due to the number of decimals and digits 
used for each calculation and solution.  
                                            
10
 For instance, Pegasus rounds 0.5 as 0 while Matlab rounds 0.5 as 1, so all the values whose 
last significant digit is “5” will be rounded differently and this will be seen in the results as a 
mistake when it isn’t – it is just different rounding modes. 
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The used example to compare is EBRE0340.09 augmented with EGNOS 
PRN120. For those corrections that are applied for each satellite separately, the 
differences for all the used satellites are plotted in the same graph but with 
different colors. 
 
 
• Long Term Correction differences 
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Fig. 3.19 Long Term Correction Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
We can observe that there are no disconformities in the Long Term Corrections 
in their X, Y and Z dimensions, but we can’t say the same about the time 
corrections, which have disconformities smaller than 1e-6, which in any case is 
considered not to be significant. 
 
 
• Satellite Position Differences 
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Fig. 3.20 Satellite Position Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
The satellite position differences between both results are smaller than 1e-6 
meters, which is, again, not significant. 
 
 
• Correction Differences 
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Fig. 3.21 Satellite Correction Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
Although it may seem that there are huge disconformities with the corrections 
results, it is not like so, as all the mistakes for the fast, ionospheric and 
tropospheric corrections are due to the different rounding methods previously 
explained, and their results are 100% consistent with Pegasus. 
 
We can’t say the same about the satellite clock correction differences, which 
have real errors smaller than 10-6m. 
 
 
• Satellite Variance Differences 
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Fig. 3.22 Satellite Standard Deviation Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
As seen in the previous figure, there are little satellite standard deviation 
differences with Pegasus smaller than 10-3m. 
 
 
• ECEF Position Differences 
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Fig. 3.23 Final ECEF Position Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
The final position results have peak errors of around 4 mm, although the 
normal, difference value between both systems results round the 0.4mm. 
 
 
• Protection Levels and System Error Differences 
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Fig. 3.24 Protection Levels and System Errors Differences with Pegasus 
 
 
The Protection Level and the System Error values are almost identical in both 
systems, with little disconformities of the order of 10-3m. 
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4. CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF 
PERFORMANCES 
 
This section is intended to give a more global understanding of the system by 
showing the calculated navigation solution and integrity parameters for different 
Earth stations with known positions. An analysis of the results (section 4.1) has 
been made for different stations, as well as an analysis of the bad performances 
(section 4.2), in order to identify the advantages and inconveniences of using 
Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems for Air Navigation. 
pol 
 
4.1. Summary of results 
 
Originally the idea of this project was to analyze the performances of the 
European SBAS system EGNOS for different Earth stations around Europe. 
Once it was finished, it was tested using WAAS data in order to check complete 
operability and compatibility between different SBAS systems. 
 
The chosen Earth stations to compute the navigation solution were: 
 
• In Europe, using EGNOS: 
 
o EBRE (Roquetes, Catalunya, Spain) 
o POTS (Potsdam, Brandemburg, Germany) 
 
• In the United States, using WAAS: 
 
o USN3 (Washington DC, East Coast) 
 
Additionally, the software was tested for a low-dynamics mobile receiver in 
Castelldefels UPC University. 
 
 
4.1.1. Results for fix stations 
 
4.1.1.1. EBRE 
 
These results were computed for Tuesday, 3rd of February 2009 using 30 sec 
observation RINEX data augmented with EGNOS satellite PRN 120 for a 
receiver in Roquetes, Catalunya, Spain.  
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Fig. 4.1 Navigation solution and Integrity Parameter results for EBRE0340.09 
using EGNOS PRN120 
 
 
As we can see in the previous pictures, these results achieve the APV-I 
performances in accuracy, integrity and availability. Although most of the time 
(96% of it) can achieve APV-II performances, the missing 4% requires the 
whole system to be certified for APV-I to achieve the required 99% of 
availability. No integrity failures are found in the all-case-data solution. 
 
The Table 4.1 shows us the compliance of this station to the civil aviation 
requirements for APV-I (see section 1.4.2). 
 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of results for EBRE0340.09 
 
 
Horizontal 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Vertical 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Availability Integrity All-Case Integrity 
Required 
for APV-I < 40 m < 50 m 
< 0.99 – 
0.99999 
> 1-
2*10-7 
> 1-2*10-
7
 
Result < 0.6285 < 0.913 1 1 1 
Is valid Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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4.1.1.2. POTS 
 
These results were computed for Tuesday, 3rd of February 2009 using 30 sec 
observation rinex data augmented with EGNOS PRN 120 for a receiver in 
Potsdam, Brandemburg, Germany. 
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Fig. 4.2 Navigation solution and Integrity Parameter results for EBRE0340.09 
using EGNOS PRN120 
 
 
The results for this station achieve all its expected performances for APV-I, as 
explained in the Table 4.2: 
 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of results for POTS0340.09 using SBAS PRN 120 
 
 
Horizontal 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Vertical 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Availability Integrity All-Case Integrity 
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Required 
for APV-I < 40 m < 50 m 
< 0.99 – 
0.99999 
> 1-
2*10-7 
> 1-2*10-
7
 
Result < 0.781 < 1.59 0.998858 1 1 
Is valid Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
4.1.1.3. USN3 
 
The following results were computed for Monday, 9th of February, 2009 using 30 
sec observation RINEX data augmented with WAAS PRN 138 for a receiver in 
Washington, DC. 
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Fig. 4.3 Navigation solution and Integrity Parameter results for USN30400.09 
using WAAS PRN138 
 
 
Although the station has no integrity problems and can be certified in normal 
conditions for APV-I, when we compute the all-case-solution we turn up to find 
that some of the possible combinations (almost a 0.5% of them) have integrity 
failures, most of them hazardous. All the WAAS examples tried have this same 
problem, according to this software results as well as for Pegasus, which may 
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mean that both codes have some mistakes which only turn up in the worse 
possible situations. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Summary of results for USN30400.09 using SBAS PRN 138 
 
 
Horizontal 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Vertical 
Accuracy 
(95% time) 
Availability Integrity 
Worse-
Case 
Integrity 
Required 
for APV-I < 40 m < 50 m 
< 0.99 – 
0.99999 
> 1-
2*10-7 
> 1-2*10-
7
 
Result < 0.74 < 0.94 0.9985 1 0.9996 
Is valid Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
 
 
4.1.2. Results for mobile stations 
 
The following results were measured on Thursday, 15th of January 2009 for a 
mobile receiver in the EPSC installations of the UPC in Castelldefels. As the 
receiver was not SBAS-enabled, the SBAS augmentation data was artificially 
added for it. 
 
Once computed, the simulation results were adapted to Google’s kml format 
and displayed on Google Earth to visualize the computed data. The results are 
displayed next. The bancroft’s method for initialization can be easily seen in the 
picture.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Navigation Solution for NACC0150.09 using Google Earth 
 
 
As the real position of the receiver at every epoch can’t be obtained, we can 
verify neither accuracy nor integrity, but we can do so with the availability, as 
this value only depends on the protection levels and the navigation mode. The 
Protection Levels Evolution can be seen in Fig. 4.5. The resulting availability 
value is 99.4453%. 
48                   Development of a SBAS-enabled software for integrity evaluation 
 
 
 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
0
10
20
30
40
50
Evolution of HPL and HSE
Epoch No
Va
lu
e 
(m
)
 
 
HPL
HSE
HAL PA
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
0
20
40
60
Evolution of VPL and VSE
Epoch No
 
 
VPL
VSE
VAL APV-I
VAL APV-II
VAL CAT-I
 
Fig. 4.5 HPL Evolution for NACC0150.09 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of degraded performances 
 
In order to achieve a better comprehension of how the SBAS system works, an 
analysis of some of the epochs with worse performances in terms of integrity 
follows, with the aim to identify the possible risky situations that the system may 
encounter. 
 
The best way to do so is to analyze the Vertical Integrity Evolution Plot, where 
the variation of the Protection Levels and the System Errors is easier to see and 
more critical. For instance, with the same example as before (EBRE0340.09), 
we can observe that there are six conflictive cases with the significantly worst 
performances, considering as “conflictive” those cases with Protection Levels 
higher than 30m or System errors higher than 2m. 
 
These cases have been signaled in Figure 4.38, and each of them has been 
individually analyzed next. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Vertical Integrity Evolution for EBRE0340.09 
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In order to analyze each case, a table has been made with the integrity 
parameters of the 6 selected cases, including, for each case: 
 
• The number of seen satellites 
• The number of used satellites (as some satellites may be cancelled by the 
SBAS system, or by invalid ephemeredes) 
• The Protection Levels (HPL and VPL) 
• The Vertical System Errors (HSE and VSE) 
• The Horizontal and Vertical Dilution of Precision (DOP11) values 
• Their UDREI values, which are considered to be “ok” if they all have normal 
operation values (this is, lower than 11) 
• Their GIVEI values, which are considered to be “ok” if all the Ionospheric 
Grid Points used have values under 11. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Summary of bad solution results for EBRE034009 
 
Case 
Number 
Seen  
Satellites 
Used  
Satellites HPL VPL HSE VSE HDOP VDOP UDREI GIVEI 
1 10 7 14,1924 35,0288 0,92 0,86 1,4085 3,8894 OK OK 
2 8 6 20 49,5 0,64 0,58 2,28 6,14 OK OK 
3 8 8 18,16 31,014 1,26 0,92 1,124 1,5038 BAD BAD 
4 8 5 14,15 38,73 1,11 1,45 1,63 3,62 OK OK 
5 7 5 15 41 1,25 -2,11 2,14 5,46 OK OK 
6 8 5 17 34 1,22 0,6 2,57 3,96 OK OK 
 
 
From the previous table we can deduce the reason of the bad performances for 
the selected cases. In all the cases except the third, the bad solution 
performances are caused by bad vertical DOP values, higher than 3’5, which 
may lead to worse results than normally. The third case, on the other hand, is 
the most interesting of them all, as it has a good DOP value, and the bad results 
are due to bad GIVEI values for various IGP points and bad UDREI values for 
some of the used satellites. 
 
As deduced from the previous examples and cases, the worse solutions can be 
caused by one, or a combination of more than one, of the following factors: 
 
• A bad satellite geometry (DOP) 
• The cancellation of several of the seen satellites, whether because they 
have a cycle slip, or they are not included in the PRN Mask, or have a “not 
monitored” mark, or an ionosphere correction can’t be provided for them. 
• The lack of confidence of the GEO satellite operator on the data it is 
broadcasting, which is transmitted to the user in bad UDREIs or GIVEIs, as 
happens in the case number 3 of the previous analysis. 
                                            
11
 The DOP is a parameter that measures the quality of the satellite geometry, expressed in the 
G matrix. If all the satellites are close in the same area of the sky the results will be worse than if 
they had well-distributed satellite geometry among the sky. As worse the geometry is, as higher 
the DOP is. A DOP of 1 is the best possible satellite geometry.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Given the current GPS performances, SBAS is a good augmentation method to 
improve the system performances and make them able to be used for the en-
route and APV-I phases of the flight. Combined with RAIM systems and other 
navigation systems such as DMEs, radar systems, inertial navigation and on-
board sensors, the complete system redundancy for air navigation can be 
achieved, and avoid the current dependency on terrestrial aids such as VORs 
and NDBs. 
 
However, with improved SPS constellations capable of achieving the air 
navigation system requirements by themselves – such as Galileo, which is 
designed to integrate the integrity evaluation parameters in its own navigation 
message – or GPS-III, the future of SBAS systems will evolve. They could be 
kept for backup or redundancy means, or be seen as something complementary 
to Galileo, or even be used for integrity warnings improvements for regional 
areas, but it is not clear whether SBAS systems will be necessary in the future 
as we understand them now, as their concepts could be integrated in the new 
Satellite Positioning Systems constellations. 
 
But, as many years will come before the complete operational validity of Galileo, 
current SBAS means can be a good transition between earth-based and 
satellite-based navigation systems, and can provide Vertical Guidance 
Approaches (APV-I) for little airports that currently don’t have vertical guiding 
systems. 
 
Meanwhile, and with the new GPS signals such as the L5, a new SBAS 
standard will be required to provide more efficient correction methods, and 
capable of working with more satellites to include GLONASS and GALILEO.  
The ionosphere corrections, on the other hand, may no longer be needed, as 
they can be cancelled using the two frequency input data. 
 
As for this project, it has achieved its objectives: the whole system has been 
implemented, combining both GPS and SBAS and including the fast, long time 
and ionospheric corrections. Its results have been tested using Pegasus, 
resulting in an almost-complete equivalence between both results, with errors or 
disconformities smaller than 10-3m. 
 
Furthermore, the system’s accuracy, availability and integrity have been 
analyzed and we can conclude that EGNOS achieves properly its expected 
integrity, availability and accuracy performances for APV-I, which paves the way 
to a possible soon commissioning of the system. 
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